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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the level of institutional ownership and 
risk-adjusted return on stocks. We find a significant positive relationship between the level of 
institutional ownership on a stock and its risk-adjusted return. This result holds both in the long 
run and in shorter time periods. Our findings suggest that all things being equal, it is possible to 
obtain risk-adjusted return by going short on the stocks with low institutional ownership and 
going long on those with a high level of institutional ownership. 
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Executive Summary 
This report examines the relationship between institutional ownership level and risk-
adjusted return. Based on the conflicting results of the prior studies, we attempt to distill the 
essence of these studies and conduct tests to see which hypothesis prevails. 
We analyze a sample data of institutional ownership percentage and return on common 
stocks, over the course of 36 years. First off, we categorize the stocks in five groups based on the 
level of institutional ownership. Afterwards, we adopt three approaches in our analysis. The first 
two focus on determining the risk-adjusted return using Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
and Fama-French (1993), and Carhart (1997) Four-Factor Model. We merge the level of 
institutional ownership with the lead risk-adjusted return as determined by the models for each 
firm. Based on observations, we conclude that portfolios with a higher institutional ownership 
tend to outperform those with lower institutional ownership. 
The third approach involves the replication of a portfolio which holds a long position in 
stocks with higher institutional ownership level and a short position in those with relatively 
lower institutional ownership level. The result of this approach is consistent with the observation 
obtained from the initial approaches. 
In a nutshell, our findings show that the level of institutional ownership is positively 
correlated with stock performance, in particular, risk-adjusted return. 
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1:  Introduction 
Institutional investors incur massive expenses on stock selection. According to Kent et al. 
(1997), total costs in the mutual fund industry exceed $10 billion per year, and more than half of 
these expenses are incurred in the stock selection efforts. Hence, the principal objective of 
institutional investors is to achieve a positive risk-adjusted stock return. Our paper explores and 
documents empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of institutional stock 
ownership and risk-adjusted return. Previous literature has presented two opposing hypothesis on 
how institutional ownership percentage affects stock performance. 
First, some studies posit the existence of a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership percentage and stock performance. It is believed that institutional investors, in an 
attempt to optimize the return on investment funds, perform better research on stocks relative to 
individual investors. Therefore, as institutional investors possess superior stock-picking abilities, 
one can expect a significant positive stock performance of firms whose stocks are largely held by 
these investors. Additionally, institutional investors own large stakes in public corporations, 
which provides a high economic incentive for these institutional investors to monitor decision 
makers. (Duggal and Millar, 1993). Under their watchful eyes, it is theorized that there will be a 
marked improvement in corporate governance and managerial efficiency, which would, in turn, 
translate into a better firm performance. 
However, some other studies in this area hold an opposing view that a negative 
relationship exists between the level of institutional ownership and stock performance. The 
major rationale behind this argument is that most institutional investors have a short-sightedness 
regarding their investments and make investment decisions that are driven by the short-term goal 
of simply outperforming a certain benchmark within the quarter. Gasper, Massa, and Matos 
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(2005) observe that institutions with short horizon might induce a costly focus on short-term 
performance without providing an offsetting increase in the monitoring of management practices. 
Therefore, rather than attempting to improve and monitor their holdings in a poorly performing 
firm, they are more likely to take exit strategies such as selling their holdings. 
 We have no ex-ante prediction on which of the two hypotheses above is true given the 
mutual exclusivity of the statements. We, therefore, test to see which of the hypotheses 
dominates regarding the effects on stocks risk-adjusted return. We employ three different 
approaches in carrying out our analysis. We further conduct subsample analysis to verify the 
robustness of our results. 
The content of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 delivers the relevant studies 
on the relationship between the level of institutional ownership and stock performance. Section 3 
describes the data and methodology utilized in conducting our analysis. Section 4 conveys 
substantial observations and results. Section 5 concludes our paper. 
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2:  Literature Review 
 Many studies have been conducted on how the level of institutional ownership affects a 
firm's performance, and in turn, stock return. Findings documented in previous literature shows 
that there is no agreed relationship. The opposing views and findings documented by researchers 
deliver a strong debate on this topic.  
 
2.1 Positive Correlation Hypothesis 
Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian (2007) report that there is a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and a firm's operating performance. Several studies 
have reported results in line with this finding. A major argument in support of this hypothesis is 
that institutional investors play a crucial role in corporate governance. Institutional investors 
have a greater ability to monitor and influence managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that 
large shareholders, usually institutional investors, have a higher incentive to monitor managers 
than members of the board of directors, who may have little or no wealth invested in the firm. 
Findings by Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) show that monitoring by institutional investors 
enhances management's focus on firm's performance. A recent study conducted by Lin and Fu 
(2017) conclude that the level of institutional ownership is positively related to firm's 
performance due to the active monitoring role of these institutions. In a similar vein, Gillian and 
Starks (2000) report that corporate governance proposals sponsored by institutional investors 
receive more favorable votes relative to those sponsored by independent investors. Aggarwal et 
al. (2010) report that firms with higher institutional investors are more likely to terminate poorly 
performing CEOs. Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that institutional ownership is negatively 
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associated with the level of executive compensation and positively associated with pay-for-
performance sensitivity. 
Another argument supporting this hypothesis is that institutional investors tend to have a 
relatively higher return on investment. This case is because institutional investors are more 
cautious in recognizing efficient companies for investment and more cautious about good firm 
performance management (Masry, 2016). Puckett and Yan (2011) observe that institutional 
investors earn significant abnormal returns on their trades within the trading quarter. In line with 
this finding, Pan and Ban (2015) state that a reason why institutional investors perform better 
relative to individual investors might be as a result of better stock selection skills possessed by 
institutional investors. 
 
2.2 Negative Correlation Hypothesis 
 Maug, 1998, however, conclude that the institutional investor's goal of maintaining 
liquidity of their holding as well as the desire to obtain short-term profit outweighs the benefits 
of monitoring managers in the hope of securing higher long-term profitability. Similarly, 
Findings of Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) suggest that institutional investors with short 
horizons may induce a potentially costly focus on short-term performance without providing an 
offsetting increase in the monitoring of management practices. Therefore, investors may choose 
to engage in costly monitoring only to the extent that it improves their trading profits, without 
regard to the impact on the firm's practice (Coffee, 1991). Similarly, Drueker (1986) state that 
institutional investors are passive investors because they will sell their holdings if the firm 
experiences inferior performance, rather than monitoring the company or providing more 
resources to enhance performance. 
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        While these opposing views dominate the debate on the impact of institutional ownership 
on firm's performance, works of some other researchers have shown that no significant 
relationship exists between the level of institutional ownership and firm's performance. For 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Millar 1999) and 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation. In conclusion, findings of prior 
studies tend to be skewed towards the positive relationship hypothesis. We, however, conduct 
our tests without any bias. 
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3: Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Source 
We obtain data for this study mainly from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
The level of institutional ownership data for the period 1980 to 2015 was derived from the Stock 
Ownership summary of Thomson Reuters database. The level of institutional ownership is 
defined as the proportion of a company's stocks that are owned by institutions such as banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, and so on (reported on 13F statements on Thompson One). 
We merge the data on institutional ownership level with data from CRSP monthly stock return 
database. We also obtain monthly data on asset pricing model factors from the Fama-French and 
Liquidity Factors database.   
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample consists of annual 
observations on common stocks of an average of 4,719 firms per year (varying from 2,617 to 
6,464), over 36 years (1980 to 2015). This data is merged with the one-year lead monthly return 
of each firm (1981 to 2016). In matching with each firm's returns, we lag the level of institutional 
ownership by one year. This lag allows for the effect of the level of institutional ownership on 
stock performance to show up. The basic idea behind this is that if the level of institutional 
ownership affects the stock performance, it presumably will do so before the period of observed 
performance. Furthermore, to mitigate the concern of small firm bias, we exclude firms with a 
market value less than $10 million. However, companies that began or ceased operations within 
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the sample period, but whose value exceeded $10 million, are included in the sample. 
Eliminating these companies would introduce a sample selection (survivorship) bias. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables 
Monthly returns are measured at the end of each month. All other variables are measured at the 
end of the calendar year. Institutional ownership is the percentage of institutional ownership as 
provided by 13F statements.  Market value is the number of shares times the price of a share. 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentile 
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Institutional Holdings (%) 33.59 27.39 0.71 9.15 27.39 54.59 84.74 
No. of Institutional Investors 76.88 130.97 2 10 29 90 301 
Market Value (in Million $) 4,362.68 81,206.79 16 56.1 194.36 869.41 10,430.69 
Price 21.91 49.89 2.06 7.5 15 27.48 60.13 
Monthly Returns (%) 15.06 0.94 -20 -5.6 0.4 6.4 22.64 
        Table 1 
 
 
 
We then group the firms into five categories based on the level of institutional ownership. 
The cut-off for inclusion in a particular quintile group is based on the empirical distribution of 
the level of institutional ownership across the firms in a given calendar year. The stocks in 
Quintile 1 have the lowest level of institutional ownership, and those in Quintile 5 have the 
highest level of Institutional Ownership. It should be noted that the compositions of each quintile 
group are rebalanced annually based on the level of institutional ownership at the end of each 
year. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the firms in each quintile group. It provides the 
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average lead return based on the classification of firms to five different quintile groups. We 
calculate the average and median raw return on stocks in each quintile group. From the table, one 
can observe that the higher the level of institutional ownership, the higher the median market 
value. Hence, this suggests that the level of institutional ownership of a firm is positively 
correlated with its market value. This observation is consistent with the findings of Del Guercia 
(1996) that many institutional investors have a preference for higher quality stocks, which are 
stocks of greater market value. 
Additionally, we observe a higher mean and median return at a higher level of 
institutional ownership. This is in line with observations from past literature that a higher level of 
institutional ownership results in better firm performance through improved corporate 
governance (Chung et al., 2002; Gillan and Starks, 2000), better corporate monitoring 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Nesbitt, 1994; Smith,1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) and 
superior stock-picking abilities of institutional investors (Pan and Ban, 2015). Another 
interesting observation from Table 2 is that the average annualized volatility of the returns 
happens to be lowest on the stock with the highest level of institutional ownership. Hence, the 
results presented in the table suggests that, on the average, firms with a high level of institutional 
ownership obtain a relatively higher return at lower risk.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables 
Return and volatility presented are both annualized. The annualized volatility of returns 
presented is computed by multiplying the standard deviation on monthly returns by the square 
root of 12. Institutional Ownership is measured at the end of the calendar year. 
 Quintiles 
 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 
      
Institutional Ownership: 
Mean (%) 
1.15 7.30 22.09 44.27 70.83 
Institutional Ownership: Median 
(%) 
0.85 6.94 20.91 42.84 72.66 
Median Market Value ($m) 57.75 65.25 109.50 292.22 940.38 
Mean Raw Return (%) 7.20 11.28 11.52 12.00 12.48 
Median Raw Return (%) 0.00 0.00 2.64 6.72 10.56 
Annualized Volatility of 
Returns (%) 
0.55 0.57 0.56 0.50 0.45 
Table 2 
 
Observations from the Figure 1 below shows the increase in mean risk-unadjusted return 
and reduction in the mean annualized volatility as the level of institutional ownership increases. 
This is in line with the significant positive correlation hypothesis on the relationship between 
institutional ownership percentage and stock performance. 
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Figure 1. Risk and Return Characteristics of Quintile Groups 
 
Figure 1 
 
Our study focuses on how the level of institutional ownership affects risk-adjusted stock 
return. Hence we do not base our analysis or conclusion on the observations from raw returns 
and volatility. Instead, we compute the risk-adjusted return on stocks, which controls for certain 
risk factors. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 Our study intends to explore the relationship between the level of institutional ownership 
and risk-adjusted return. Risk-adjusted return is the difference between the actual return on a 
stock and its expected return. In determining the expected return on the stocks selected, we use 
two different models to control for other factors that determine expected return as documented in 
previous expected return literature. First, we control for the market risk premium; we regress the 
monthly returns using the CAPM Model (Jack Treynor, 1961; William F. Sharpe, 1964; John 
Lintner, 1965a, b and Jan Mossin, 1966, independently). 
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R(t) - RF(t) = a + b{RM(t) - RF(t)} + e(t)       (1) 
where : 
R: the rate of return on the stock 
RM-RF: the excess of the market return over the risk-free return 
a: alpha or risk-adjusted return - the excess of actual return over expected return 
Secondly, we control the size and value premium factor using the Fama - French Model 
(Fama and French, 1993), with the inclusion of the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. It is 
necessary to control for the size factor as we observe a positive correlation between the level of 
institutional ownership and market value of firms in the sample. Using the size-adjusted return 
controls for this problem. Similarly, Demiralp et al. (2011) noted the importance of controlling 
for momentum while computing risk-adjusted return when testing the effect of the level of 
institutional ownership. We could find a positive relationship between risk-adjusted return and 
the level of institutional ownership if institutional investors are attracted to buy past winners or 
sell past losers. 
R(t) - RF(t) = a + b{RM(t) - RF(t)} + sSMB(t) + hHML(t) + uUMD(t) + e(t)  (2) 
where: 
R: the expected rate of return of the stock 
RM-RF: the excess of the market return over the risk-free return 
SMB: the premium of the size factor 
HML: the premium on the book-to-market factor 
UMD: the premium on winners minus losers 
a: alpha or risk-adjusted return - the excess of actual return over expected return 
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 To explore the relationship between institutional ownership and risk-adjusted return, we 
calculate the average risk-adjusted return for each level of institutional ownership quintile group. 
Afterwards, we conduct a t-test analysis to determine the significance of the difference between 
the mean risk-adjusted return on stocks in the highest and lowest quintile groups. 
 To verify the robustness of our findings, we classify the sample period of 36 years into 
four subsample periods as shown in Table 3. Our classification is based on major economic 
events within the sample period. Information on the significant economic events is obtained from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. The unique nature of 2008, due to the severe 
recession experience in that year makes it inappropriate to be included either as a part of the 
Moderate Expansion period or the period following the Great Recession. Therefore, we exclude 
this year in analyzing the effect of institutional ownership level on risk-adjusted return over the 
four major economic periods in our sample. 
 
Table 3. Classification of Time Period 
Period Rationale 
 
1981 - 1990 
 
Economic Recovery after the 1973 -1975 recession 
1991 - 2001 Economic Expansion fueled by the Dot Com bubble 
2002 - 2007 Moderate Expansion Period 
2009 - 2016 Period Following the Great Recession of 2008 
  Table 3 
 
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research 
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 Finally, we form a self-financing portfolio in which for each year, we take a short 
position on stocks in the quintile group that underperforms and long position on stocks in the 
quintile group that outperforms. The core idea behind this approach is that where a significant 
relationship exists between the lag level of institutional ownership and stock return, then it 
should be possible to take advantage of this relationship in creating a portfolio of stocks that 
would produce a positive significant risk-adjusted return. 
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4: Results 
4.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Table 5. Mean Risk-Adjusted Return Based on Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Risk-adjusted returns are annualized. The superscript ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
.01, .05 and .1 levels respectively 
Quintile 
 
Overall 
Period 
Economic Periods 
1981 - 1990 1991 - 2001 2002 - 2007 2009 - 2016 
 
1 -0.020 -0.093 -0.001 0.045 0.044 
2 0.000 -0.058 0.012 0.049 0.005 
3 0.000 -0.040 0.005 0.044 -0.001 
4 0.001 -0.033 0.008 0.011 0.005 
5 0.003 -0.015 -0.003 0.005 0.003 
Mean (5)-Mean (1) 0.023*** 0.079*** -0.003 -0.039*** -0.040*** 
Table 4 
 
In Table 4, we present the average risk-adjusted return on stocks in each quintile group. 
For the entire sample period, we observe a positive and higher risk-adjusted return at a higher 
level of institutional ownership. This suggests that stocks with a higher level of institutional 
ownership outperform those at a relatively lower level of institutional ownership. However, there 
is a less clear ordering over the subsample time periods analyzed. In some economic periods, the 
average risk-adjusted return under the CAPM model tends to increase with the level of 
institutional ownership quintile, but not always: after 2001, mean risk-adjusted return on stocks 
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with low institutional ownership appears to be relatively higher than those with a higher level of 
institutional ownership. We conduct t-test analysis to better understand the significance of the 
difference between the average risk-adjusted return of the highest and lowest quintile groups. 
As presented in Figure 2, the average risk-adjusted return over the entire sample period 
increases at the higher level of institutional ownership. This observation indicates that stocks 
with the lowest level of institutional ownership underperform relative to other stocks in the long 
run. 
 
Figure 2.  Mean Annual Risk-Adjusted Return by Applying CAPM Model (1981 – 2016) 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
For robustness check, Figure 3 shows the mean risk-adjusted return at the different level 
of institutional ownership over the subsample periods. Interestingly, we observe inconsistencies 
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economic period analyzed. Before 2001, stocks with a higher level of institutional ownership 
-0,02 
0 0 0,001 
0,003 
-0,025
-0,02
-0,015
-0,01
-0,005
0
0,005
0,01
1 2 3 4 5
R
is
k
-A
d
ju
st
e
d
 R
e
tu
rn
 
Institutional Ownership Level 
Risk-Ajusted Return (1981 - 2016) 
Alpha
16 | P a g e  
 
significantly outperformed those at a relatively lower level of institutional ownership. However, 
after 2001, we observe the opposite: stocks in the lower quintile group significantly 
outperformed those in the higher quintile group.  
 
Figure 3. Mean Annual Risk-Adjusted Return by Applying CAPM Model  
(Subsample Periods) 
 
Figure 3 
 
This is somewhat surprising, and we do not have a clear intuition as to the reason behind 
this result. In general, we would expect a similar result over all the economic periods. 
Consequently, while the pre-2001 observation appears to be consistent with the first hypothesis 
that states that a higher level of institutional ownership enhances risk-adjusted return due to 
optimal use of institutional investment funds and a greater incentive to monitor decision makers 
of firms, the post-2001 observation tends to be in line with the hypothesis that states that a 
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short-sightedness and passivity of institutional investors. Perhaps, this suggests that after 2001, 
there has been an increase in the passivity and a decrease in the active engagement institutional 
investors in companies. Nevertheless, this consistency over the economic periods may also be as 
a result of failure to account for certain risk factors that could significantly affect risk-adjusted 
return.  
 
 
4.2 Fama-French Model 
Table 5. Mean Risk-Adjusted Return Based on Fama-French and Carhart Factor Model 
Risk-adjusted return are annualized. The superscript ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
.01, .05 and .1 levels respectively 
Quintile 
 
Overall Period 
Economic Periods 
1981-1990 1991-2001 2002-2007 2009-2016 
1 -0.044 -0.099 -0.027 -0.004 -0.051 
2 -0.014 -0.045 -0.001 0.020 -0.018 
3 -0.012 -0.031 0.002 0.015 -0.016 
4 0.000 -0.013 0.011 0.009 0.000 
5 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.000 
mean(5) - 
mean(1) 0.051*** 0.108*** 0.027*** 0.020** 0.051*** 
Table 5 
 
 Following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), we compute the average risk-
adjusted return on the stock in the different quintile groups. In controlling other risk factors that 
can affect the expected return on a stock, this model addresses one of the concerns raised by the 
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inconsistency in the observations over short-term periods under the CAPM Model. Table 5 
presents the results of the average risk-adjusted return under this model. Our observation for the 
entire sample period is consistent with what we obtain using the CAPM Model. The average 
risk-adjusted return increase with the level of institutional ownership. However, unlike our 
observation using the CAPM Model, the results appear to be consistent over the shorter 
economic periods.  
 We further examine the average risk-adjusted return among the various quintile groups 
by testing the significance of the difference between the mean risk-adjusted return. We report the 
results in carrying out a t-test analysis on the mean risk-adjusted return on the stocks in the 
different quintile groups in Table 5. As observed in Figure 4, over the entire sample period, 
stocks with a higher level of institutional ownership significantly outperformed those with a 
relatively lower level of institutional ownership. Additionally, for the shorter periods analyzed, 
the observation remains consistent as it is illustrated in Figure 5. In most cases, stocks with 
higher institutional ownership had a relatively significantly higher risk-adjusted return. 
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Figure 4. Mean Annual Risk-Adjusted Return by Applying Fama-French & Carhart 
Model (1981 - 2016) 
 
Figure 4 
Figure 4. Mean Annual Risk-Adjusted Return by Applying Fama-French & Carhart 
Model (Subsample Period) 
 
Figure 5 
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Furthermore, we address the concern of inconsistency in the results obtained from using 
the CAPM model over the short economic period analyzed. The Fama and French (1993) small 
firm effect theory holds that smaller firms, or companies with smaller market capitalization, on 
the average, outperform the relatively larger firms. In the summary statistics provided on our 
sample, there appears to be a positive correlation between the level of institutional ownership 
and market value of firms. That said, one could expect that stocks in the lower quintile group 
should ordinarily have a higher risk-adjusted return where this factor is left uncontrolled, due to 
the value premium.  Therefore, this could imply that the post-2001 observation under the CAPM 
model could have resulted from the effect of the size premium on stocks' risk-adjusted return 
exceeding the effect of the level of institutional ownership. Consequently, controlling for the size 
factor and other return predictability factors identified by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997), we obtain more consistent observations over the economic periods considered. In 
general, our results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the level of 
institutional ownership and risk-adjusted return. 
 
4.3 Portfolio Approach 
 We strengthen the conclusions derived from the CAPM and Fama French model by 
forming a self-financing portfolio whereby we take a short position on stocks in quintile 1 group 
and simultaneously take a long position on stocks in quintile 5 at the same month. Consistent 
with the approach applied by Ban and Pan (2015), taking simultaneous long and short positions 
would have the effect of canceling out any bias from using an inappropriate asset pricing model 
or estimates of factor loadings.   
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 As we observe in our results that stocks with a higher level of institutional ownership 
outperformed those with a lower level of institutional ownership, we expected to obtain a 
significant positive risk-adjusted return in the portfolio formed by going short on stocks with low 
institutional ownership and long on stocks with high institutional ownership. Table 6 presents the 
results of the average risk-adjusted return on this portfolio. 
 
Table 6. Risk-Adjusted Return from Taking a Short Position on Stocks in Quintile 1 and a 
Long Position on Stocks in Quintile 5 
 
Model 
 
Weight 
 
Overall 
Period 
Economic Periods 
1981-
1990 
1991-
2001 
2002-
2007 
2009-
2016 
 
 
CAPM 
Equal 
Weighted 
0.0345*** 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.013** 
Value 
Weighted 
0.014*** -0.002 -0.005 0.064*** 0.019*** 
 
Fama - 
French 
Equal 
Weighted 
0.025*** 0.060*** 0.029*** 0.007* 0.006* 
Value 
Weighted 
0.016*** 0.011** -0.008* 0.054*** 0.011** 
Table 6 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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5:  Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of the level of institutional ownership on stock 
performance. In particular, we focus on risk-adjusted return. We analyze the monthly returns on 
stocks with distinct levels of institutional ownership over the course of 36 years. We proceed to 
determine the monthly risk-adjusted return by controlling for various risk factors that could 
predict expected return. We find that stocks with a higher level of institutional ownership, in 
most cases, significantly outperformed those with a relatively lower level of institutional 
ownership. 
The results presented in this study confirm a relationship between the level of 
institutional ownership in a firm and stock performance. Specifically, we find a significant 
positive relationship between the level of institutional ownership and risk-adjusted return, both in 
the long run and within shorter economic periods. We also find that all things being equal, it is 
possible to obtain significant positive return by going short on stocks with a low level of 
institutional ownership and simultaneously going long on stocks with a high level of institutional 
ownership.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Quintile 
Difference in Mean Risk-Adjusted Return using CAPM Model 
 
 
Overall Period 
Economic Periods 
1981-1990 1991-2001 2002-2007 2009-2016 
mean(2) - mean(1) 0.020*** 0.035*** 0.012* 0.005 -0.038*** 
mean(3) - mean(1) 0.020*** 0.053*** 0.052 0.000 -0.045*** 
mean(4) - mean(1) 0.020*** 0.060*** 0.008 -0.034*** -0.038*** 
mean(5) - mean(1) 0.023*** 0.079*** -0.003 -0.039*** -0.040*** 
mean(3) - mean(2) 0.000 0.018** -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 
mean(4) - mean(2) 0.001 0.025*** -0.004 -0.039*** 0.000 
mean(5) - mean(2) 0.004 0.043*** -0.015** -0.044*** -0.002 
mean(4) - mean(3) 0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.034*** 0.007 
mean(5) - mean(3) 0.004 0.025*** -0.008 -0.039*** 0.005 
mean(5) - mean(4) 0.003 0.018*** -0.011* -0.005 -0.002 
Table 7 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
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Appendix B 
   
 
Quintile 
Difference in Mean  Risk-Adjusted Return using Fama-French Model 
 
Overall Period 
Economic Periods 
1981-1990 1991-2001 2002-2007 2009-2016 
mean(2) - mean(1) 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.026*** 0.024** 0.031*** 
mean(3) - mean(1) 0.033*** 0.068*** 0.029*** 0.019* 0.033*** 
mean(4) - mean(1) 0.045*** 0.086*** 0.038*** 0.013 0.045*** 
mean(5) - mean(1) 0.051*** 0.108*** 0.027*** 0.020** 0.051*** 
mean(3) - mean(2) 0.002 0.014 0.003 -0.005 0.002 
mean(4) - mean(2) 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.012 -0.011 0.014*** 
mean(5) - mean(2) 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.001 -0.004 0.020*** 
mean(4) - mean(3) 0.012*** 0.018** 0.009 -0.007 0.017*** 
mean(5) - mean(3) 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.002 0.000 0.018*** 
mean(5) - mean(4) 0.006* 0.022*** 0.009 0.007 0.006* 
Table 8 
* Significantly different from zero at 10% level; 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level; 
***Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
 
 
 
